Abstract. The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We characterize this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve a goal, they share their knowledge before acting. Based on this assumption, we propose new semantics for alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information and perfect recall. It turns out that this semantics is sufficient to preserve all the desirable properties of coalition ability in traditional coalition logics. Meanwhile, we investigate how knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. This work provides a partial answer to the question: which kind of group knowledge is required for a group to achieve their goals in the context of imperfect information.
Introduction
Reasoning about coalitional abilities and strategic interactions is fundamental in analysis of multiagent systems (MAS). Among many others [8, 14, 15, 25, 27] , Coalition Logic (CL) [22] and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [2] are typical logical frameworks that allow to specify and reason about effects of coalitions [16] . In a nutshell, these logics express coalition ability using a modality in the form, say G ϕ, to mean coalition G (a set of agents) can achieve a property ϕ, regardless what the other agents do. ATL/CL assume that each agent in a multi-agent system has complete information about the system at all states (perfect information). Obviously this is not always true in the real world. Different agents might own different knowledge about their system. To model the systems in which agents have imperfect information, a few attempts have been made in the last few years by extending ATL with epistemic operators [11,17,19,26,?,?] . With the extensions, agents' abilities are associated with their knowledge. For instance, assuming a few agents are trying to open a safe, only the ones who know the code have the ability to open the safe.
One difficulty of ATL with imperfect information is how to model knowledge sharing among a coalition. In other words, if a group of agents form a coalition, whether their knowledge will be shared and be contributed to the group abilities [13] ? To the best of our knowledge, most of the existing epistemic ATL-style logics do not assume that members of a coalition share knowledge unless the information is general knowledge [7, 24] or common knowledge [11] to a group or a system. However, most of the time when a set of agents form a coalition, their cooperation is not merely limited to acting together, but, more importantly, sharing their knowledge when acting. Safe opening is an example.
This chapter aims to take the challenge of dealing with knowledge sharing among coalitions. By a coalition we mean a set of agents that can not only act together to achieve a goal, but also share their knowledge when acting. We say that a coalition can ensure ϕ if the agents in the coalition distributedly know that they can enforce ϕ. Based on this idea, we provide a new semantics for the coalition operator in ATL with imperfect information. It turns out that this semantics is sufficient to preserve desirable properties of coalition ability [12, 22] . More importantly, we investigate how knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability through the interplay of distributed knowledge and coalition ability. Our contribution is twofold: firstly, this work can be seen as an attempt towards the difficulty: which kind of group knowledge is required for a group to achieve some goal in the context of imperfect information; secondly, these results show that the fixed-point characterizations of coalition operators which normally fail in the context of imperfect information [3, 4] can be partially recovered by the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a motivating example for our new semantics. Section 3 provides the new semantics and investigates its properties. Section 4 explores the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators. Section 5 discusses related work. Finally we conclude the paper with future work.
A Motivating Example
Let's consider the following example which highlights our motivation to study coalition abilities under the assumption of knowledge sharing within coalitions. Example 1. Figure 1 depicts a variant of the shell game [7] with three players: the shuffler s, the guessers g 1 and g 2 . Initially the shuffler places a ball in one of the two shells (the left (L) or the right (R)). The guesser g 1 can observe which action the shuffler does, while the other guesser g 2 can't. A guesser or a coalition of two wins if she picks up the shell containing the ball. We assume that the guesser g 1 takes no action (n) and the guesser g 2 chooses the shell (the left (l) or the right (r)).
Clearly, g 1 knows the location of the ball but cannot choose. Instead g 2 does not know where the ball is, though he has right to choose the shell. It's easy to see that neither g 1 nor g 2 can win this game individually. But if g 1 and g 2 form a coalition, it should follow that by sharing their knowledge they can cooperate to win. However, according to the existing semantics for ATL with imperfect information including the latest one, called truly perfect recall (also referred as no-forgetting semantics) [7] , the coalition of g 1 and g 2 does not have such ability to win since they claim that coalition abilities require general knowledge or even common knowledge.
Moreover, these semantic variants fail to preserve the coalition monotonicity which is a desirable property for coalition ability in coalitional logics [12, 22] , that is, if a coalition can achieve some goal, then its superset can achieve this goal as well. For instance, the model M 2 in Figure 2 depicts a variant game of Example 1 by just switching the available actions of two guessers. The guesser g 1 chooses the shell and the guesser g 2 takes no action. Then it's clear that the guesser g 1 can win no matter what the others do, as he sees the location of the ball and can pick up the right shell. It should follow that as a group, the guessers g 1 and g 2 can win this game. However, according to most existing semantics, though the guesser g 1 has the ability to win, this ability no longer holds once he forms a coalition with guesser g 2 . These counterintuitive phenomena motivate our new semantics for ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall.
The Framework
In this section, we provide a new semantics for ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall based on the assumption of knowledge sharing in coalitions, and then investigate logical properties of ATL under this semantics.
Syntax of ATL
Let Φ be a countable set of atomic propositions and N be a finite nonempty set of agents. The language of ATL, denoted by L, is defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ Φ and ∅ = G ⊆ N . A coalition operator G ϕ intuitively expresses that the group G can cooperate to ensure that ϕ. The temporal operator 2 means "from now on (always)" and other temporal connectives in ATL are U ("until") and ("in the next state"). The dual operator 3 of 2 ("either now or at some point in the future") is defined as 3ϕ = def Uϕ. Moreover, the standard epistemic operators can be defined as follows: K i ϕ = def i ϕUϕ and D G ϕ = def G ϕUϕ. As we will show in the semantics, these abbreviations capture their standard intuitions, i.e., "K i ϕ" says the agent i knows ϕ, and D G ϕ means it is distributed knowledge among the group G that ϕ. The dual operators of K and D are defined as follows:
Semantics of ATL
The semantics is built upon the imperfect information concurrent game structure (iCGS) [17, 24] .
where -N = {1, 2, · · · , k} is a nonempty finite set of players; -Φ is a set of atomic propositions; -W is a nonempty finite set of states;
is a mapping specifying nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state. We will write d i (w) rather d(i, w). The set of joint actions at w for N is denoted as 
A path λ is an infinite sequence of states and actions w 0
→ w l of a path is called a history. The set of all histories for M is denoted by H. We use λ[j] to denote the j-th state on path λ, λ[j, k] (0 ≤ j ≤ k) to denote the segment of λ from the j-th state to the k-th state, and λ[j, ∞] to denote the subpath of λ starting from j. The length of history h, denoted by |h|, is defined as the number of actions.
The following definition specifies what a player with perfect reasoning capabilities can in principle know at a special stage of an imperfect information game.
Definition 2. Two histories
where α k (i) is the i-th component of α k .
Intuitively, two histories are indistinguishable for an agent if (1) they have the same length, (2) their corresponding states are indistinguishable for this agent, and (3) the agent takes the same action at the each corresponding stage. Our notion of perfect recall is more like GDL perfect recall [11, 25] as well as perfect recall in extensive games [21] by requiring that an agent remember the past states as well as her own actions. This is stronger than the one in most epistemic ATL-style logics which often use the statebased equivalence without taking the actions into consideration, that is, a (truly) perfect recall agent just remembers the past states. Our version has the advantage to deal with situations where different actions may have the same effects. For instance, consider two histories q 0 a → q 1 and q 0 b → q 1 with a single agent. According to the state-based equivalence, the agent cannot distinguish the two histories, but actually they are different from her view since she takes different actions at state q 0 3 . Note that the perfect recall agent does not observe or remember other agents' actions.
In particular, we say two paths λ and λ are equivalent up to stage j ≥ 0 for agent
As mentioned before, we assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve their goals, the agents share their own knowledge before acting. To make this idea precise, we extend the indistinguishability relation ≈ j i to groups as the intersection of all its members' individual equivalence relation, i.e., ≈
denote the set of all paths that are indistinguishable from λ up to stage j for coalition G, i.e., ≈
A strategy is a plan telling one agent what to do at each stage of a given game. With knowledge sharing among members of a coalition G ⊆ N , we say a strategy of agent i ∈ G is uniform if the strategy specifies the same action for i at all histories which are indistinguishable for G. Formally, Definition 3. Given i ∈ G ⊆ N , a uniform perfect recall strategy for agent i w.r.t G is a function f i : H → A such that for any history h, h ∈ H,
where last(h) denotes the last state of h.
Intuitively, a uniform perfect recall strategy for an agent in a group tells one of her legal actions to take at each history and specifies the same action for indistinguishable histories of the group. In particular, the standard notion of uniform strategies with respect to individual knowledge can be viewed as a special case. In the rest of paper, we simply call a uniform perfect recall strategy a strategy.
A joint strategy for group ∅ = G ⊆ N , denoted by F G , is a vector of its members' individual strategies, i.e., f i i∈G . Function P(h, f i ) returns the set of all paths that can occur when agent i's strategy f i executes after an initial history h. Formally, λ ∈ P(h, f i ) iff λ[0, |h|] = h and for any j ≥ |h|, f i (λ[0, j]) = θ i (λ, j) where θ i (λ, j) is the action of agent i taken at stage j on path λ. Obviously, the set of all paths complying with joint strategy F G after h is defined as P(h, F G ) = i∈G P(h, f i ). It should be noted that if a group is characterized by full coordination both on the level of strategies and knowledge, we may view the group as a single agent whose abilities and knowledge are the sum of those of all the members [?] .
We are now in the position to introduce the new semantics for ATL. Formulae are interpreted over triples consisting of a model, a path and an index which indicates the current stage on the path. Definition 4. Let M be an iCGS. Given a path λ of M and a stage j ∈ N on λ, the satisfiability of a formula ϕ wrt. M , λ and j, denoted by M, λ, j |= ϕ, is defined as follows:
The interpretation for the coalition operator G ϕ captures its precise meaning that the coalition G by sharing knowledge can cooperate to enforce that ϕ. Alternatively, the agents in G distributedly know that they can enforce that ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid in an iCGS M , written as M |= ϕ, if M, λ, j |= ϕ for all paths λ ∈ M and every stage j on λ. A formula ϕ is valid, denoted by |= ϕ, if it is valid in every iCGS M .
We first show that, as we claimed before, the abbreviations capture the intended meanings of the epistemic operators. Proposition 1. Given an iCGS M , a path λ of M and a stage j ∈ N on λ,
Proof. We just prove the first clause, and the second one is proved in a similar way. It suffices to show that M, λ, j |= i ϕUϕ iff for all λ ≈ j i λ, M, λ , j |= ϕ. The direction from the right to the left is straightforward according to the truth condition for U. We next show the other direction. Suppose M, λ, j |= i ϕUϕ and for all λ ≈ j i λ, then there is f i such that for any λ ∈ P(λ [0, j], f i ), M, λ , j |= ϕ. And
We demonstrate with the variant shell game that the new semantics justifies our intuitions that the coalition of two guessers by sharing their knowledge can win the game.
Example 1 (continued.) Consider the model M 1 in Figure 1 . It's easy to check that at the stage 1 on the left path λ 1 := q 0 q 1 q 2 · · · , neither guesser g 1 nor guesser g 2 has the ability to win at the next stage, i.e., M 1 , λ 1 , 1 |= g 1 win and M 1 , λ 1 , 1 |= g 2 win. Instead when g 1 and g 2 form a coalition, after sharing knowledge, the guesser g 2 is able to distinguish the history q 0 q 1 from the history q 0 q 1 , then they can cooperate to win, i.e., M 1 , λ 1 , 1 |= {g 1 , g 2 } win. For the coalition monotonicity property, consider the model M 2 in Figure 2 . It's easy to check that at the stage 1 on the left path λ 1 := q 0 q 1 q 2 · · · , guesser g 1 has the ability to win at the next stage by choosing the left shell, i.e., M 2 , λ 1 , 1 |= g 1 win. Moreover, when g 1 and g 2 form a coalition, then they can cooperate to win, i.e., M 2 , λ 1 , 1 |= {g 1 , g 2 } win.
It should be noted that the reason why alternative semantics [7, 11, 24] fail to keep the coalition monotonicity property is that their interpretations of coalition operators G ϕ are given with respect to either the union of each member's equivalence relation or its transitive reflexive closure. This means that the coalition ability implicitly requires general knowledge or common knowledge of the group, while neither of them is coalitionally monotonic. Instead distributed knowledge is sufficient for coalition ability to preserve the coalition monotonicity property.
Properties of the New Semantics
We first show that the new semantics satisfied the desirable properties of coalition ability in traditional coalitional logics [12, 22] .
Similarly for the 2 and U operators.
Clause 1 says that no coalition G can enforce the falsity while 2 states every coalition G can enforce the truth. 3 and 4 specify the outcome-monotonicity and the coalitionmonotonicity, respectively. 5 is the superadditivity property specifying disjoint coalitions can combine their strategies to achieve more. 6 is called G-regularity specifying that it is impossible for a coalition and its complementary set to enforce inconsistency. The next proposition provides interesting validities about epistemic and coalitional operators.
Proposition 3. For any G ⊆ N and any ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
Proof. We only give proof for the first two clauses and the proof for 2, U is similar.
1. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ, assume M, λ, j |= G ϕ, then there is F G = f i i∈G such that for all λ ∈≈ j G (λ), for all λ ∈ P(F G , λ [0, j]), M, λ , j + 1 |= ϕ. We next show that F G is the joint strategy to verify G D G ϕ. Suppose for a contradiction that there is
. And by assumption we have M, λ * , j + 1 |= ϕ. It follows that M, λ 3 , j + 1 |= ϕ: contradiction. Thus, M, λ, j |= G D G ϕ. The other direction is straightforward. 2. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ, assume M, λ, j |= G ϕ, then there is
We consider the strategy F G and it is easy to check that for all
Note that it is not generally the case that |= G ϕUψ → G D G ϕUD G ψ. Here is a counter-example. Consider the model M 3 in Figure 3 with two agents 1 and 2 and states {q 0 , q 1 , q 1 , q 2 , q 2 }, where q 1 R 1 q 1 , but not for 2, and all the other states can be distinguished by both agents. There are two propositions p, q, and π(p) = {q 1 }, π(q) = {q 1 , q 2 }. The transitions are depicted in Figure 3 . Consider the left path
Fig . 3 . the counter-model M3 Fig. 4 . the counter-model M4
It follows from Proposition 3 that the distributed knowledge operator and the coalition operator are interchangeable w.r.t temporal operators and 2.
The Fixed-point Characterization
In this section, we will investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability in ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall. We first show that, similar to [3, 4] , the standard fixed-point characterizations of coalition operators for ATL [12] fail under our new semantics. 
Here is a counter-example for the first one. Consider the model M 4 in Figure 4 which is obtained from M 3 by just changing the valuations. There is one proposition p, and π(p) = {q 1 , q 2 , q 2 }. Consider ϕ := p and the left path λ 1 := q 0 q 1 q 2 · · · . Then it is easy to check that M 4 , λ 1 , 1 |= p and
On the other hand, we have the following proposition showing that the converse direction for 2 holds under the new semantics.
Proof. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ, assume M, λ, j |= G 2ϕ, then there is
It suffices to show that F G is just the joint strategy for the both coalition operators. That is, for all
we want to prove that for all r ≥ j + 1 M, λ 4 , r |= ϕ. As λ 4 ∈ P(F G , λ 3 
. So by the assumption we have that M, λ 4 , t |= ϕ, so M, λ, j |= G G 2ϕ. Thus, M, λ, j |= ϕ ∧ G G 2ϕ.
We now present the main result about the interactions of group knowledge and coalition ability for ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall. Recall that K and D be the dual operators of K and D, respectively.
In recent years, there are many logical formalisms for reasoning about coalition abilities and strategic interactions in MAS. [10, 13] provide a latest survey of this topic. In this following, we will review several works which are most related to ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall.
In the context of imperfect information, several semantic variants have been proposed for ATL based on different interpretations of agents' ability [1, 19, 24, 17] . In particular, [6, 18] provide formal comparisons of validity sets for semantic variants of ATL. Similar to Bulling et al.'s no forgetting semantics [7] , our semantics is also historybased w.r.t a path and an index on the path, but there are fundamental differences. First of all, we consider a finer notion of perfect recall by taking both past states and actions into considerations to deal with situations where different actions may have the same effects. Secondly, our notion of group uniform strategies is defined in terms of distributed knowledge instead of general knowledge as we assume that when a set of agents form a coalition, they are able to share their knowledge before cooperating to ensure a goal.
Several epistemic-ATL style logics have been proposed to investigate the interaction of group knowledge and coalition ability [6,11,24,?,?] . In particular, the most relevant works are [11,?] . Specifically, [?] presents a variant of ATL with knowledge, perfect recall and past. Different from our motivation, they use the distributed knowledge of coalitions so as to have a decidable model-checking problem. [11] proposes three types of coalition operators to specify different cases of how all agents in the coalition cooperate to enforce a goal. Among them, the communication strategy operator G c captures the intuition behind our coalition operator. Specifically, we have the following correspondence.
Proposition 6. Given an iCGS M , a path λ of M and a stage j ∈ N on λ, let ϕ be any formula of the form ψ, 2ψ or
However, their work is different from ours in the following aspects: firstly, they propose two epistemic versions of ATL, namely uATL and euATL, to address the issue of uniformity of strategies in the combination of strategic and epistemic systems, while we introduce a new semantics without adding new operators to the language to explore the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators; secondly, their results mainly focus on the relations and logical properties of three coalition ability operators, while we investigate fixed-pointed characterizations for the interplay of distributed knowledge and coalition operators which is not involved in [11] ; thirdly, their meaning of coalition is more subtle than ours. Except the communication strategy operator, the comparison with the other two strategy operators is less straightforward since they are based on assumptions of coalitions without sharing knowledge. We hope to understand them better in the future.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that [15] adopts a similar meaning of coalition so as to capture the notion of "knowing how to play". Besides the different motivations, that work is based on STIT framework and just considers one-step uniform strategies without investigating the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
In this paper, we have proposed new semantics for ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall to explore the interplay of the knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition abilities. Compared to existing alternative semantics, we have showed that our semantics can not only preserve the desirable properties of coalition ability in traditional coalitional logics, but also provide a finer notion of perfect recall requiring an agent remembers the past states as well as the past actions. More importantly, we have investigated the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
In the future we intend to study the computational complexity of ATL with this new semantics, such as the model-checking problem. In this paper, we have investigated how knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability. This work can be seen as an attempt towards the question: which kind of group knowledge is required for a group to achieve some goal in the context of imperfect information. We believe that it is an interesting question for further investigation by considering other cases such as group without knowledge sharing or with partial knowledge sharing [?] .
